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reflection of some of what I have learned from Wynne Godley. 1 By Way of a Preamble1
"All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a well-panelled
Board Room and a nicely regulated market, are liable to collapse.
....
Perhaps the reader feels that this general, philosophical disqui-
sition on the behaviour of mankind is somewhat remote from the
economic theory under discussion. But I think not. .... I accuse the
classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite
techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from
the fact that we know very little about the future."
John Maynard Keynes ([39], p. 215)
A Dynamical system capable of computation universality is subject to the
Halting Problem for Turing Machines. Hence no future steady state ￿even if
formally provable to ￿ exist￿￿is calculable, even given all past and present infor-
mation exactly. Unknowability, undecidability and uncomputability of steady
states, transients or any other dynamic trajectory are the dominant epistemic,
epistemological and methodological issues of what may be called the algorith-
mic universe that seems to dominate many kinds of mathematical formalisms
trying to encapsulate theories of the social sciences and humanities in the form
of implementable models. The age of formal mathematics, proving the existence
of non-constructible, non-computable, undecidable entities in economics, may,
in the fullness of time, come to be seen as having occupied an insigni￿cant,
sorry, period in the grand development of economic theory that was initiated by
the classical economists, nobly preserved and enhanced by the development of
macroeconomics, and revived and rejuvenated ￿after the unfortunate interreg-
num of the neoclassical synthesis, its replacement by varieties of monetarisms,
the brief interlude of neo keynesianism and the current, although fading, domi-
nance of newclassical economics ￿by post Keynesian economics2.
My main aim in this essay is to extract possible analytical precepts, from
the continuing evolution of Postkeynesian economic theory, to suggest the way
I think the rich Keynesian tradition ￿mostly, though not exclusively, of the
1On the whole, I shall not enter into the continuing debates on who or what characterises
Postkeynesian economics, except for one issue: the place that should be occupied by the Neo
Wicksellians, by whom I mean the second generation Swedish Wicksellians, Lindahl, Myrdal,
Hammarskj￿ld and Lundberg (but not Ohlin). I leave these debates ￿perhaps they ought to
be referred to as ￿ controversies￿in the warm glow left behind by [31] and [23] ￿to the specialist
scholars. Su¢ ce it to acknowledge that I have been pleasurably enlightened by [22], [40], [?],
[48] and some of the ensuing reviews (particularly [10] and [86]). I would be dishonest if I did
not also confess that I was both mysti￿ed and angered ￿from a purely intellectual point of
view ￿by the preposterous review of King (op.cit) by Davidson ([4]).
2As always, Hicks with characteristic prescience, acknowledged the obvious ([29], p.13):
"Marshall and Pigou are called ￿ neo-classics￿ ; but they were anti-classics. It is
the post-Keynesian who would better be called neo-classics; for it is they who,
to their honour, have wrought a Classical Revival."
2multiplier-accelerator variety ￿of nonlinear, endogenous, non-stochastic theo-
ries of the business cycle, should be ￿ fertilised￿ , so that the current dominance of
the linear, exogenous, stochastic-shock theory3, i.e., Real Business Cycle (hence-
forth, referred to as RBC) theory, could be challenged and supplanted, even-
tually. My stance here follows the idea of a ￿ constructive engagement with
mainstream economics￿suggested in persuasive ways by Fontana in several of
his writings (op.cit, p. 414 & [11]). In another sense, I aim to suggest this
￿ constructive￿- although critical ￿￿ engagement with mainstream economics￿in
analogy with the way Postkeynesian economics has contributed to enriching
mainstream growth theory4.
A ￿ constructive engagement￿with the protagonists of RBC, who are often
dismissive of any approach to business cycle theory that is not intrinsically
mathematical in their particular sense, is not easy, unless any alternative is
also explicitly mathematical in its formulation. The leading exponent of RBC,
Prescott, has gone even as far as enunciating that ([72], p.2; second set of italics
added)5:
"[T]he meaning of the word macroeconomics has changed to refer
to the tools being used rather than to the study of business cycle
￿ uctuations."
The implicit ￿ tenor and tone￿of this essay is, therefore, also mathematical,
but hopefully without too many compromises with ￿ responsibility to the canons
of scholarship￿([82], p.605).
With these aims in mind the essay is organised as follows. In the next section
I attempt to extract precepts from the rich traditions of the many strands
of post Keynesian economics for the modelling of a Postkeynesian theory of
aggregate ￿ uctuations. In section 3 I try to summarise the way I think the
classics of nonlinear, non-stochastic, endogenous theories of the business cycle ￿
incorporating, naturally, also growth ￿satisfy many of the precepts extracted in
section 2. In section 4, a summary of Minsky￿ s approach to modelling ￿ crisis￿is
outlined, mostly critically. As far as I am concerned, Minsky is a distinguished
contributor to the richness of the post Keynesian vision of economic crisis. The
concluding section is a brief summary of the broad lessons to be gleaned from
the approach taken in trying to understand how to make the precepts of post
3Or, the theory of ad-hoc shokeries, Richard Day￿ s felicitous phrase to describe the mod-
elling methodology of the Newclassicals in general and the Real Business Cycle theorists, in
particular (cf. [5], p. 180).
4See, for example, Harcourt￿ s excellent discussion in chapter 7 of [24].
5Obviously, Prescott did not pay attention to Stigler￿ s ([82], p.605; italics added) admon-
ishment of Samuelson￿ s methodology in the Foundations of Economic Analysis ([73]):
"Some of the in￿nities of mathematical possibilities are discussed, but only in the
most formal terms; there is no instance of the enlargement of our knowledge of
economic processes in our society. Samuelson may reply that he is only providing
tools, but who can know what tools we need unless he knows the material on
which they will be used?"
3Keynesian economics become intrinsic to a mathematical modelling of economic
dynamics with intrinsic undecidabilities, incompleteness and uncomputabilities.
There is one non-standard stance I take in this essay, following the tradi-
tion I leanred from my own sometimes-Postkeynesian maestro, Richard Good-
win: there is no incongruency or inconsistency in harnessing Schumpeter for
Postkeynesian purposes!
2 Postkeynesian Precepts: Beyond ￿ only another
box of tricks￿
"What we have tried to show is that within the various strands
that we have discerned and described, there are coherent frameworks
and approaches to be found, though obviously there remain within
each un￿nished business and unresolved puzzles. The real di¢ culty
arises when attempts are made to synthesize the strands in order to
see whether a coherent whole emerges. Our own view is that this is
a misplaced exercise, that to attempt to do so is mainly to search
for ... ￿ only another box of tricks￿to replace the ￿ complete theory￿
of mainstream economics which all strands reject. The important
perspective to take away is, we believe, that there is no uniform way
of tracking all issues in economics and that the various strands in
post Keynesian economics di⁄er from one another, not least because
they are concerned with di⁄erent issues and often di⁄erent levels of
abstraction of analysis."
[22], pp.24-5; ￿rst italic in the original.
￿ The various strands in post Keynesian economics￿not only ￿ di⁄er from one
another ... because they are concerned with di⁄erent issues and often di⁄erent
levels of abstraction of analysis￿ , but also because the analytical, conceptual and,
above all, methodological and epistemic foundations are wholly underpinned by
what that arch non-Keynesian, Schumpeter, would have referred to as a vision of
dynamic economic development, whether of advanced, emerging or developing
economies. I believe, and agree wholeheartedly with Hamouda and Harcourt
(and, thereby, happily also with Joan Robinson), that there is no - cannot ever
be, and has never been - a ￿ complete theory￿ , or, more pertinently, a uni￿ed
theory based on acknowledged closures6, of every aspect of dynamic economic
6The o¢ cial neoclassical closure - which is what uni￿es newclassical, New Keynesian and
even core aspects of Austrian economics - are the triptych of preferences, endowments and
technology, on which the maximization￿ equilibrium edi￿ce stands. Variations on the triptych,
like the much-hyped notion of information as a supplement to them, adds no further insight
to the sterile basis, nor its infertile superstructure. I have spent most of the last quarter of a
century showing, with ￿ o¢ cially￿sanctioned mathematical rigour, that neither the neoclassical
closure, nor the edi￿ce that stands on it, are capable of handling anything remotely interesting
from any formally interesting dynamic point of view (cf., for example: [92] & [93]). By
￿ formally interesting dynamic point of view￿ , I mean computation, formal dynamical systems
theory (particularly nonlinear dynamics), rationality, reproducibility, evolution, and so on
4development, as is explicitly and implicitly argued, or at least tacitly accepted,
by every kind of orthodox economics.
In the recent comprehensive, almost exhaustive (if such is conceivable), Elgar
Companion to Post Keynesian Economics ([41]), the Editor￿ s opening charac-
terisation of the subject is most instructive for anyone attempting to suggest
precepts for constructing a Postkeynesian Theory of the Business Cycle, es-
pecially on the groundings of Cambridge or Minskyan Theories of Aggregate
Economic Fluctuations (p. xiv):
"Stripped down to the bare essentials, Post Keynesian economics
rests on the principle of e⁄ective demand: in capitalist economies,
output and employment are normally constrained by aggregate de-
mand, not by individual supply behaviour. ..... Moreover, there
exists no automatic or even minimally reliable mechanism that will
eliminate excess capacity and involuntary unemployment."
At least from the point of view of these ￿ bare essentials￿ , both Cambridge
Theories of the Business Cycle and (any) Mynskian Crisis Theory are, surely,
squarely Postkeynesian in their conceptual underpinnings and analytical frame-
works. In the above admirably concise characterisation, King emphasises, im-
plicitly and explicitly and correctly in my view, seven essential Postkeynesian
precepts for any dynamic theory of aggregate ￿ uctuations7: aggregate demand,
the fallacy of composition, involuntary unemployment, the (endemic nature of
the persistence of) excess capacity, instability, the absence of any conceivable
self-adjusting mechanism towards (any kind of, mythical or not, unique or not)
equilibrium and thereby, disequilibria and the existence of multiple equilibria.
In addition to these seven Postkeynesian precepts for a macroeconomic (ag-
gregate) theory of ￿ uctuations, I would like to suggest that the following are
also among the characterising features of modelling aggregate ￿ uctuations by
one or another strand of post Keynesian economics: non-maximum dynamics,
- issues that lie at the heart of ostensibly fractured strands of Postkeynesian economics. I
take this opportunity to acknowledge Lance Taylor￿ s priority in using the notion of ￿ closure￿ ,
although I did not know, till a few months ago, that he had been using it since at least 1979
(in joint work with Frank Lysy). I began using the word in the above sense from around 1983.
7King does not suggest that these are Postkeynesian precepts for an aggregate ￿i.e., macro-
economic ￿theory of ￿uctuations, i.e., business cycle theory. This is my extraction from King￿ s
perceptive summary. Regrettably, however, King￿ s own various remarks, thoughts and com-
ments on business cycle theory in [40] including the entry on business cycles in [41] leave much
to be desired. For example, in the latter (p. 39), we are informed that:
"Micha￿Kalecki (along with Ragnar Frisch and Eugene Slutsky) was a pioneer
of the external shock approach."
In the former we are assured, referring to Kalecki￿ s classic, [35], p. 38, that,
"The mathematical foundations of Kalecki￿ s model were ... assessed by Ragnar
Frisch and Jan Tinbergen ... . Frisch con￿rmed the integrity of the analysis [in
[35]]."
Unfortuantely in the latter case, and fortunately in the former case, these claims are not
even remotely correct.
5￿ time-to-build￿production and implementation, non-ergodicty, complexity and
systemic uncertainty of the dynamical system encapsulating a Postkeynesian
theory of the business cycle. One or another of the post Keynesian strands
referring to the latter ￿ve concepts do not invoke them, or encapsulate them, in
any theory of the business cycle, whether Postkeynesian or not. Moreover, even
the ￿ senior￿post Keynesian or Keynesian authors (and some of their ￿ derivative￿
followers) who pioneered their consideration (in particular non-ergodicity8 and
complexity9), refer to and invoke them, for criticising mainstream economics,
8I have in mind here, primarily, [3], among the ￿ senior￿ authors and, for example, [8],
among the ￿ derivative￿ , younger followers. Paul Davidson￿ s paper is littered with a plethora of
technical infelicities and, even in 1983, it was known that there were mean ergodic theorems for
many realistic classes of non-stationary stochastic processes. Moreover, Davidson￿ s paper has
some serious conceptual and philosophical infelicities, even worse than his technical mistakes.
His typos border on the hilarious (LaPlace, Wald instead of Wold, etc.). The silliest assertion
in Davidson￿ s paper has to do with a serious ￿ accusation￿against Keynes: ￿Unfortunately,
in his day, Keynes did not have access to the meticulous work of the Moscow School of
Probability which developed in exacting detail the now standard theory of stochastic processes.
In retrospect, therefore, we can only seek to reinterpret Keynes￿￿ne intuition of the distinction
between uncertain and probable events in terms of such processes.￿ (p. 188). This is utter
and complete nonsense, for many reasons. First of all, the ￿ Moscow School of Probability￿
underpinned their theory of stochastic processes on precisely the kind of theories of probability
that Keynes rejected. Secondly, it is simply not true that ￿ we can only seek to reinterpret
Keynes￿￿ne intuition.. in terms of such processes￿ . (italics added). Neither Davidson, nor
indeed Pasinetti, seem to be aware of the massive developments in algorithmic probability
theory, at the hands of Kolmogorov, Solomono⁄ and Chaitin and that Solomono⁄￿ s starting
point was the Keynesian theory of probability. Dunn￿ s entry on Non-ergodicity in [41] is
equally replete with technical and conceptual infelicities. For example, what is one to make
of the thoroughly muddled and technically senseless following claim ([41], p.281):
"However, as some stationary stochastic processes are non-ergodic, that is, limit
cycles, non-stationarity is not a necessary condition for the existence for [sic!]
non-ergodic processes. But all non-stationary processes are non-ergodic. Non-
stationarity is thus a su¢ cient condition for non-ergodicity and provides an
empirical foundation for Post Keynesian claims about the relevance of history
and uncertainty."
What is the status of, for example, of the following limit cycle (expressed in polar coordi-




; _ ￿ at that value of r which makes it unstable?
9Pasinetti, in referring to the ￿ Walrasian behavioural model￿([70], p.229) claims:
￿It could very simply be rejected even on the basis of the well-known principle of
the possibility of emerging characteristics in the analysis of any complex system.￿
This sentence is simply false. Firstly, it is not true that so-called ￿ emerging characteristics￿
￿frankly, I am not sure what the author actually means by ￿ emerging characteristics￿ , but I
assume, provisionally, he is referring to what has become fashionable in much of the Santa Fe
inspired agent based economic literature ￿can be generated by ￿ any complex system￿ . Sec-
ondly, there is no rigorous de￿nition of ￿ emerging characteristic￿￿i.e., ￿ emergent phenomena￿
￿such that it is possible to impute the phenomenon to the laws of dynamics under which ￿ any
complex system￿generate such phenomena. I can generate any number of ￿ complex systems￿
which are provably incapable of generating so-called ￿ emergent phenomena￿ ; conversely, I can
show how to generate so-called ￿ emergent phenomena￿ by extremely simple systems. The
evolution of the concept of ￿ emergents￿ , ￿rst at the hands of George Henry Lewes, inspired
by John Stuart Mill and, then, intensively developed by the British Emergentists ([58]), to
resurface via von Neumann and Ulam, in the modern versions is itself a complex phenomenon
that deserves more serious thought than such ￿ippant allusions.
6do so on the basis of thoroughly faulty mathematical underpinnings.
Now, by non-maximum dynamics I mean what was ￿rst referred to by Paul
Samuelson in his Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture as follows:
￿I must not be too imperialistic in making claims for the ap-
plicability of maximum principles in theoretical economics. There
are plenty of areas in which they simply do not apply. Take for ex-
ample my early paper dealing with the interaction of the accelerator
and the multiplier. This is an important topic in macroeconomic
analysis. .....
My point in bringing up the accelerator-multiplier here is that
it provides a typical example of a dynamic system that can in no
useful sense be related to maximum problem.
[74], pp. 12-13; italics added.
In including ￿ time-to-build￿as one of the Postkeynesian precepts for (mathe-
matical) modelling of aggregate ￿ uctuations I am only making explicit what is,
ostensibly, acknowledged as one of the key building blocks of orthodoxy￿ s core
assumptions in developing real business cycle theories, and which was fundamen-
tal in Kalecki￿ s classic of 1935, and thereafter remained central to his evolving
versions of that classic; it was, as well, a key assumption in the canonical nonlin-
ear equation that summarised the Cambridge Theories of the Business Cycle. In
the latter two cases the resulting, ￿nal form, equation for aggregate ￿ uctuations
were linear10 and nonlinear deterministic di⁄erence-di⁄erential equations.
As for ￿ systemic uncertainty￿ , which I consider to be of crucial conceptual
importance in the construction of any aggregate, Postkeynesian, theory of the
business cycle, I shall not follow convention and refer to chapter 12 of the GT
and the tiresome cliche of an underpinning in the (in)famous ￿ animal spirits￿for
substantiation11. With the notable exception of Robin Matthews ([57]), very
few appear to have tried to link the origins of the use of the phrase ￿ animal
10Kalecki, alas, always linearised, even when it was highly dubious to do so from any
economic point of view. I have discussed, in some detail, the ￿ time-to-build￿ tradition in
business cycle theory, in a recent essay (cf. [94]). This is a tradition that goes back to
Volume II of Das Kapital and comes down through Bohm-Bawerk, to the ￿ modern￿era of
mathematical modelling of business cycles, initiated by Tinbergen in 1931 ([85]). Bohm-
Bawerk￿ s assumption, and the Austrian and, later, the Neo-Austrian traditions, as well, were
not linked explicitly to aggregate ￿uctuations. Some purists may be able to refer to the Neo-
Austrian notion of traverse as a manifestation of growth cycles. Thoughts along such lines
are discussed in [94].
11Nor do I wish to refer to [43] and his much ￿ maligned￿use of the distinction between risk
and uncertainty. Most scholars are, of course, aware that both [37] and [43] were published
the same year (1921). But few post Keynesian scholars are aware that between Lindahl￿ s ￿rst
lectures on monetary macroeconomics in 1921 (published in 1924 as [50]) and his subsequent
pioneering Neo Wicksellian contributions (beginning with [51]) to what came to be called the
economics of the Stockholm School, there was Myrdal￿ s doctoral dissertation ([66]), deeply
in￿uenced by both [37] and [43]. It was this that was instrumental in the way that Wicksell￿ s
immediate Swedish macroeconomic followers, Lindahl, Myrdal, Hammarskj￿ld and Lundberg,
incorporated expectations and anticipations ￿now fashionably referred to as non-probabilistic
uncertainty ￿into their monetary macroeconomics, and thereby, via Brinley Thomas￿ s LSE
lectures, in￿uenced the pioneering contributions of George Shackle. But this is a stroy that is
7spirits￿to Keynes￿ s early, undergraduate, essay on Descartes (cf, Matthews, op.
cit, pp. 105-6)12. This fact, should be coupled to the two coincidences of: (a)
Keynes purchasing Descartes￿Les Passions de l￿ ￿me (translated, unfortunately
as, ￿ animal spirits￿ , see [27], p. 483), just around the time he was drafting the
￿rst versions of Chapter 12; and (b) Richard Kahn￿ s remembrance, reported in
Matthews (op. cit, footnote 2, p. 104; italics added), that:
￿Chapter 12 was apparently written less carefully and in a more
light-hearted spirit [sic!] than most of the General Theory. It was
not subjected to the scrutiny of the group of younger colleagues
assembled by Keynes to help him ... .￿
I am not sure the signi￿cance attached to Chapter 12 of the GT, by many
post Keynesians, are for all the right reasons; indeed, they may well be for
misleading reasons. But in this they are not more culpable than hoi polloi.
Instead, to encapsulate the notion of systemic uncertainty in a Postkeynesian
theory of aggregate ￿ uctuations, I shall keep in mind, but not develop the
formalism here, the bounded rationality/bounded uncertainty nexus, introduced
by Herbert Simon ([79]) and George Shackle ([78]), respectively, within the
framework of decision problems in the precise sense of metamathematics (cf.,
chapters 10 & 11) [92]), which leads to the characteristically simple, yet deep,
observation by the latter (ibid, p. 74):
￿[A] world where there are constraints upon the ways in which
events can follow each other, yet where even a complete and perfect
knowledge of these constraints would leave us ignorant of ￿ what will
happen next￿ ;...￿
This idea is precisely formalisable in terms of the famous theorem of the
Halting Problem for Turing Machines, and if the dynamical system modelling
a Postkeynesian theory of aggregate ￿ uctuations can be shown to be equivalent
to a Turing Machine, then systemic uncertainty in the sense of Shackle above
will be exhibited by that system. My strong conjecture is that the nonlin-
ear dynamics of Postkeynesian endogenous, nonstochastic, models of aggregate
￿ uctuations can be shown to be capable of computation universality and, thus,
formally equivalent to the computing behaviour of a Turing Machine. The full
development of this conjecture must await a di⁄erent exercise.
not central to the main theme considered in this paper and must be left for another occasion.
To complete this potted, capsule, history, there are those, like Frydman and Goldberg, [12],
who would also include Hayek to the Keynes-Knight nexus, at least on this issue of the risk-
uncertainty divide.
12Matthews, acknowledging his indebtedness to Dr Gay Meeks, suggests that Keynes, most
plausibly, may have been inspired by Hume, to use this phrase in the sense in which it was
meant to be interpreted in Chapter 12. However, my own ￿admittedly less than exhaustive
￿ Keynes scholarship￿￿view is that Keynes ￿rst came across the term in Descartes, but had it
strengthened in his mind when writing A Treatise on Probability ([37]), where Hume plays an
important role. I believe it is time these connections are studied more deeply and the tangled
origins sorted out more clearly.
8In summary, then, I have tried to identify the following twelve Postkeynesian
precepts, some combination of which should form the basis for a Postkeynesian
theory of aggregate ￿ uctuations:
(1). aggregate demand; (2). the fallacy of composition; (3). involuntary
unemployment; (4). the persistence of excess capacity; (5). functional distri-
bution (of income and wealth); (6).instability; (7). absence of self-adjusting
mechanisms (i.e., intrinsic or natural negative feedback mechanisms) towards
unique (or one or another of a multiple) equilibrium; (8). disequilibrium; (9).
non-maximum dynamics; (10). ￿ time-to-build￿ 13; (11). non-ergodicity; (12).
systemic uncertainty; (13). complexity; (14) historical time.
Surely, (3) and (4) should be subsumed into one precept14. It can be shown
that non-maximum dynamics (8), instability (6), disequilibria (7) and multiple
equilibria (7) form one uni￿ed quadruple. Finally, any serious, rigorous, formal
dynamics must consider non-ergodicity (10), complexity (13) and historical time
(14) together in a nonlinear framework, if it is to be seriously Postkeynesian in
theorising about aggregate ￿ uctuation endogenously and nonstochastically15.
This leaves seven Postkeynesian precepts that a mathematical theory of aggre-
gate ￿ uctuations should be constrained by, in its construction. The immediate
question would be: how many of these are satis￿ed by mainstream economics?
The answer is: exactly one: ￿ time-to-build￿- but this is encapsulated within the
standard production function apparatus, which is subject to the strictures of one
respectable strand of post Keynesian economics, within a theory constrained by
uniquely stable equilibrium con￿gurations generated by ergodic, non-complex,
maximum dynamical systems, without involuntary unemployment or excess ca-
pacity, generally insensitive to the fallacy of composition. Furthermore, in the
era of a methodology dominated by RBC (cf., [72]), calibration of the mythical
aggregate production function, particularly in its much-maligned Cobb-Douglas
13My friend, sometime colleague and former mentor, Mario Nuti, when he looked at [94],
where I emphasised the crucial role of ￿ time-to-build￿ in Kalecki￿ s theories of the business
cycle, wrote back as follows (e-mail, 21 January 2011):
"I could only browse, it would take ages for me to get through it and do it full
justice, but thanks for keeping me posted.
The "gestation period" always had a great importance both in Kalecki￿ s theory
of capitalist macroeconomics and for his work on investment planning under
socialism. All due to his own experience as the son of a manufacturer who went
bankrupt, I am not sure in what cycle."
14Involuntary unemployment is a concept de￿ned at the individual level and, therefore,
mainstream economics has concentrated on ￿ debunking￿ it. This is because the notion of
a decision variable which is not underpinned by a ￿ voluntary￿ act makes it impossible to
implement it within an optimization framework, driven by ￿ Olympian rationality￿([80], p.12).
For the reason that it is a concept de￿ned at the individual level, I subsume it within the
general notion of the persistence of excess capacity, as in standard Cambridge theories of the
business cycle.
15For example, in the canonical equation encapsulating Cambridge theories of aggregate
￿uctuations in nonlinear, endogenous, nonstochastic modes, this means, at the minimum,
that the ￿ initial conditions￿must play a signi￿cant part in the determination of the dynamics
￿ whether of the short-run or long-rum variety, whether leading to one or another kind of
attractor or remains unclassi￿able and in transition.
9version, functional income distribution16, (5), is e⁄ectively ignored.
And neither money ￿at least via liquidity preference17 - nor market struc-
ture18 have even been mentioned!
It is in this sense that I think Hamouda & Harcourt were absolutely on the
mark with their wise injunction to refrain from trying to ￿nd a uniform way of
tracking all issues in economics so that a complete theory to replace orthodoxy
can be constructed. The search for ￿ complete theories￿ , like the doomed pur-
suit for a ￿ uni￿ed theory of knowledge￿ , and other such paranoidal obsessions
has been the bane of intellectual integrity for too long. The mainstream mis-
adventures with ￿ complete theories￿are themselves ￿ complete￿red herrings: it
is possible to construct thoroughly trivial complete theories without any cor-
respondence with the elements of ontology or epistemology. Any attempt at
constructing a post Keynesian ￿ complete￿ theory, satisfying all of the above
seven precepts (plus liquidity preference) should be resisted in the wise sense in
which it is gently discouraged by Hamouda and Harcourt
Yet, the main positive contribution of this paper is the claim that Cambridge
theories of the business cycle, suitably modi￿ed and interpreted, encapsulate all
of the above core Postkeynesian precepts, but the incorporation of systemic un-
certainty in the sense of Shackle, above, requires the dynamical system encap-
sulating the theory of ￿ uctuations to be interpreted in terms of the (computing)
behaviour of a Turing Machine. This interpretation is achieved via the demon-
stration of an equivalence between the computing behaviour of a (Universal)
Turing Machine and a nonlinear dynamical system capable of what I have come
to call computation universality19.
16This is one important issue that dominates at least one strand of post Keynesian economics
with links to the noble tradition of classical economics.
17I have quite deliberately refrained from introducing liquidity preference as a precept in
the above context for a very special reason: money, especially in the form of ￿nance or (bank)
credit, enters the Cambridge theory of aggregate ￿uctuations via balance sheet, national
accounting and social accounting rules, that are themselves dynamic. This is particularly
clear in Minsky￿ s work, as made especially explicit in Lance Taylor￿ s elegant formalisations
([83] & [84]).
18Both Kalecki and Harrod ([25], [26]) emphasise imperfect market structures in their the-
ories of aggregate ￿uctuations; the former in pricing, especially. However, it is not clear to
me that imperfect market structures are among the fundamental precepts for a Postkeynesian
theory of aggregate ￿uctuations.
19It may be apposite and necessary to point out that I am not referring at all to so called
￿ deterministic chaos￿in the construction of such an equivalence.
103 Cambridge Theories of the Business Cycle20
"Once progress is admitted on the ground ￿ oor of a theory the
awkward question arises about the historical validity of the system.
The relevance and usefulness of economic theory to economic history
has been small. If anything, business cycle theory has done better
than some other branches. The situation becomes more serious the
moment we restrict ourselves to a theory simple enough to be written
down in a few equations. To imagine any connection between such
a model and economic history seems grotesque, and yet, if there is
no relation, there seems little use in constructing it."
Richard Goodwin ([18], pp.207-8).
The canonical ￿ few equations￿of Cambridge theories of aggregate ￿ uctua-
tions may have been underpinned by one or another ￿ theory simple enough￿
to be encapsulated by them; but the ￿ few equations￿ , (indeed the one canoni-
cal equation21), have de￿ed complete analysis for the more than one hundred
years during which they have been studied, analytically, experimentally, com-
putationally and geometrically, by a galaxy of pure mathematicians, applied
mathematicians, physicists, numerical analysts, computer scientists and meta-
mathematicians. Surely, the enigma that is the canonical equation mirrors the
riddle that it tries to encapsulate: capitalist economic development - a fact which
was known to those who tried to fashion, less and more successfully, Cambridge
theories of aggregate ￿ uctuations.
3.1 Background
"Keynes￿General Theory was exclusively concerned with a mon-
etary economy in which changing beliefs about the future in￿ uence
the quantity of employment. Yet money plays no more than a per-
functory role in the Cambridge theories of growth, capital, and
distribution developed after Keynes."
[44]; bold emphasis, added.
20I consider [45] a repository of some of the true classics of post Keynesian economics,
contrary to the obviously uninformed opinion expressed in [40], p.9. Thus, for example, [7],
[30] and [46] have come to play important parts in the development of various strands of post
Keynesian economics, both explicitly and implicitly. Contrariwise, I don￿ t consider [1] of any
relevance to either post Keynesian economics or as making any contribution to a Postkeynesian
theory of endogenous, nonlinear, nonstochastic theory of aggregate ￿uctuations. Both books
have ￿ Post-Keynesian￿in their titles. Incidentally, Davidson￿ s reference to an example in Blatt
([3], footnote 1, p.186, [1], pp. 204-216) is simply wrong. Blatt is not computing anything for
a limit cycle, but for a ￿ centre￿type dynamics, which is, by the way, structurally unstable.
21I am, of course, referring to the forced Rayleigh-van der Pol equation (in the form given it
in Goodwin￿ s de￿ning classic of Postkeynesian business cycle theory, the Nonlinear Accelerator
and the Persistence of the Business Cycle [17], p.12):
￿￿￿ y + [￿ + (1 ￿ a)￿] _ y ￿ ’(_ y) + (1 ￿ a)y = ￿(t) (1)
11Does, then, money play any role in possible Cambridge Theories of the Busi-
ness Cycle22 ￿ developed after Keynes￿? Indeed, are there Cambridge Theories
of the Business Cycle in the same sense in which there are Cambridge theories
of growth, capital and distribution? One of my aims, not necessarily the main
aim, in this essay is to substantiate the claim that there were, in fact, clear,
identi￿able, Cambridge Theories of the Business Cycle, incorporating growth,
(functional) income distribution and money.
However, although Kregel￿ s perceptive observation was made a quarter of a
century ago, I believe there is a central core of truth in it that may appear to
be valid, even for Cambridge Theories of the Business Cycle, at least if one re-
lies on the more comprehensive expository characterisations of the development
of Postkeynesian economics since 193623. In the ensuing quarter of a century,
since Kregel￿ s claim, despite the sometimes stuttering incorperation of Minsky￿ s
work on the interaction between ￿nancial system and aggregate ￿uctuations24,
theories of the business cycle ￿with and without money, whether of Cambridge
origin or not ￿seem to occupy, at best, a shadowy existence in the character-
isation of Postkeynesian economics, itself being enacted, thus far, almost as a
Japanese Noh drama.
The acknowledged classics of the nonlinear, endogenous, non-stochastic the-
ory of business cycles, in the mathematical mode, are [16]25, [17], [18] [19], [32]
and [28]. Obviously, even if [35] predates The General Theory ([38], henceforth,
GT) and Lundberg￿ s remarkable ￿ Studies￿([53]) appeared almost simultane-
22The older, more vintage, term used for this phenomenon was trade cycle theory ￿although
in the classics by Goodwin and Kalecki the more modern phrase was used. I shall adhere to the
￿ more modern phrase￿in this essay, purely for simplicity, but also with the hope of engaging
some variants of orthodoxy in my case for taking seriously some, at least, of the Postkeynesian
analytical precepts for modelling business cycles.
23In other words, since the publication of [38], to which I shall henceforth refer simply
as GT. However, my own understanding of Postkeynesian economics is heavily and deeply
informed and in￿uenced by the pre-Keynesian writings of Lindahl ([51], [52]), Myrdal ([66],
[67]), Hammarskj￿ld ([21] and Lundberg ([53]), all of whom emphasised the monetary basis of
aggregate economic ￿uctuations. In this sense, then, I do not think of Postkeynesian economics
as a vision that is con￿ned strictly to the post-GT period. I cannot imagine any Postkeynesian
￿ perhaps woth the possible exception of Paul Davidson ([4]), particularly those interested
in business cycle theories ￿not including Kalecki￿ s pioneering writings that preceded the GT
(for example [35]) in any sensible characterisation of Postkeynesian economics. Although [53]
was published in 1937, I subscribe to Schumpeter￿ s view ([77], pp. 1173-4) on this classic,
"But no work of this range and depth can, within a single year, be formed by an
outside in￿uence unless its author has arrived at somewhat similar conclusions
by himself."
24See below, section 4.
25In this remarkable review of Hicks￿classic, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade
Cycle, Goodwin unshackled the endogenous, nonlinear, non-stochastic theory from relying on
the accelerator as the economy approaches the ￿ ￿oor￿ . This meant the construction of a planar
dynamical system generating a stable limit cycle, that was, for the ￿rst time, independent of
the Rayleigh-van der Pol ￿ cubic characteristic￿ . This construction also provided the impetus
for the uniqueness proof of the existence of a limit cycle, the latter routinely proved by an
appeal to the PoincarØ-Bendixson theorem (see [89] & [90] for complete details and references).
In the standard ￿ story￿of nonlinear, nonstochastic, endogeous theories of the business cycle,
the pioneering role of [16] & [18] are, to the best of my knowledge, never acknowledged.
12ously with the GT, they, too, should be ￿and often, especially Kalecki, are
considered to be ￿part of the set of ￿ acknowledged classics￿in this genre. Of
these latter two, Lundberg￿ s classic, in what the Neo Wicksellians referred to
as the sequence analysis tradition was squarely in the nonlinear, endogenous,
non-stochastic tradition of business cycle theories, despite its fame in the stan-
dard business cycle literature in the linear form bestowed it by Metzler ([59]).
However, the Kalecki classic, in spite of its intrinsic nonlinear structure, was
linearised and studied as a mixed linear di⁄erence-di⁄erential equation in the
standard literature, and even by the master himself26.
I would like to add two personal remarks and one additional point to ￿ sub-
stantiate￿the contents of the previous two paragraph. When I ￿rst attended
Goodwin￿ s lectures on Economic Dynamics, at Cambridge University in the
Michaelmas term of 1973, he wrote up, on the blackboard, just three refer-
ences: Schumpeter ([75]), Kalecki (op.cit) and Lundberg (op.cit). Secondly,
when Goodwin reminisced about the development of mathematical theories of
the business cycle, in the post-depression 1930s, at the Conference in honour of
Bj￿rn Thalberg27 in the following way:
"The Great Depression of the 1930s appropriately gave rise to the
￿rst28 precise, quantitative cycle models. First came a highly origi-
nal piece by Michael Kalecki, but it was succeeded by the more fa-
mous and successful Hansen-Samuelson multiplier-accelerator model,
to be followed by the related Lundberg-Metzler inventory cycle."
[20], p.87.
The ￿ additional point￿I wish to emphasise is the following: right from the
outset, Goodwin￿ s development of nonlinear, endogenous, non-stochastic the-
ory of ￿ uctuations was inspired by Keynes of the GT and Schumpeter￿ s theory
of innovations ([75]). This was re￿ ected in every pioneering aggregate nonlin-
ear, endogenous, non-stochastic, dynamic model developed by Goodwin, all the
way from 1946 till his classic paper in the Dobb Festschrift ([19]). Ironically,
much of the interpretative literature has tended to claim that the ￿rst series
of contributions by Goodwin, (i.e., up to, but not including [19]), all of them
representable by some variation of the canonical equation (1), concentrated on
a theory of aggregate ￿ uctuations in which either growth was an exogenous
trend component or, worse, entirely absent. This is simply untrue. The tril-
ogy that represented the core contributions by Goodwin to a Cambridge theory
of aggregate ￿ uctuations in a nonlinear, nonstochastic, endogenous model were
produced in the intensive consecutive years of 1950 ([16]), 1951 ([17]) and 1952
26This aspect is highlighted in my essay in the Harcourt Festschrift ([87]).
27Who was my ￿rst teacher of economics and, indeed, who introduced and initiated me into
the weird and wonderful world of nonlinear, endogenous, nonstochastic theories of the business
cycle of the Kaldor-Goodwin-Hicks variety before I came under the magical spell of Cambridge
theories of aggregate ￿uctuations at the feet of Goodwin himself. All this happened during
an intensive, unforgettable, three-year period, 1971-1973.
28He had forgotten that his own references to the ￿ ￿rst precise, quantitative cycle model￿ ,
in lectures, was to Tinbergen￿ s famous Ein Schi⁄bauzycklus ([85]).
13([18]), the latter ￿rst presented in 1952. All of them were models of ￿ growth
cycles￿in a clear macrodynamic sense, with the cyclical part built on Keyne-
sian elements of aggregate demand, excess capacity, instability, disequilibrium,
multiple equilibria, non-ergodic/complex historical time and encapsulating the
fallacy of composition; the growth part owed its construction and incorporation
in these classic and pioneering models on the basis of Schumpeter￿ s theory of
innovations. This is no where better characterised than in [18]29 (pp.204-6):
"In order to fuse growth and cycle unalterably we may make
the following two assumptions: (a) economic progress is not steady
but comes in spurts, these spurts occurring primarily in booms; (b)
the cycle is not a case of over￿and under￿ shooting of a stationary
level, but rather it is dominated by ￿and possibly would not exist
without ￿economic growth. The source of these two assumptions
is Schumpeter and, in my opinion, it is in his work that we shall
￿nd the most fruitful ideas for the problem of trend and cycle. ....
Schumpeter￿ s theory, as he often complained, is di¢ cult to formu-
late in simple mathematical terms30. ... Schumpeter￿ s original, pure
theory can be put simply: ￿ The recurring period of prosperity of
the cyclical movement are the form progress takes in capitalist31
society￿ .32 ...He thus fused into an organic whole the concepts of
29Remembering that it was ￿rst presented at the celebrated Oxford IEA Conference on The
Business-Cycle in the Post-War World, in September, 1952, (where Kaldor was also present
and presented his contribution to the same part of the book in which Goodwin￿ s paper was
published). The relevance of the observation within parenthesis will become clear shortly.
30Compare this measured re￿ection, on the ￿ di¢ culty￿of formulating Schumpeter￿ s theory
of innovation ￿ in simple mathematical terms￿ , to Kaldor￿ s lofty dictum ([33], p. 53; italics
added):
"[I]t is not possible to make the [Schumpeter] story as a whole into a ￿ model￿
(meaning by a model the sum total of assumptions which are just su¢ cient ￿
no more no less - together to provide the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
the generation of a recurrent cycle with a clear periodicity) without incorporating
into it elements which would su¢ ce by themselves to explain the cycle ￿without
recourse to Schumpeter￿ s own stage army of initiators and imitators, or even the
very concept of techincal progress."
Two comments are in order: one, how does Kaldor know that ￿ it is not possible to make the
[Schumpeter] story as a whole into a model￿? Is this an ￿ impossibility theorem￿ , within some
mathematical formalism of theories and models? Secondly, it is precisely the construction of a
￿ model￿to encapsulate the ￿ Schumpeter story￿that was attempted and achieved in [14] ￿but,
of course, not ￿ with a clear periodicity, which was not a criterion in the ￿ Schumpeter story￿ .
31Observe that Schumpeter uses the word ￿ capitalistic￿ , not ￿ capitalist.
32The original statement by Schumpeter was followed by a characteristically honest caveat
([76], p.295; second set of italics added):
"The recurring periods of prosperity of the cyclical movement are the form
progress takes in capitalistic society. ...By saying this we mean to state a fact
requiring both proof and explanation. Whilst we hope to be able to contribute,
..., something towards the latter, it is impossible here to satisfy the reader as to
the former."
Perhaps it was this last italicised phrase that prompted Kaldor to make his characteristically
14growth and cycle, and implied that the one could not exist without
the other. .... It has always seemed to me that the theory of e⁄ec-
tive demand and liquidity preference could be used to bring greatly
enhanced usefulness to Schumpeter￿ s theory, but it is plain that he
would have none of it."
Thus, as far as my own interpretation of Cambridge theories of aggregate
￿ uctuations is concerned, as a strand in the post Keynesian economics of growth
cycles33, the basis in the classics ￿Marx, in particular ￿and in Schumpeter have
to be acknowledged and I am happy, privileged and proud to do so and consider
myself a member of that lineage.
It is unfortunate that Kaldor34, maverick post Keynesian though he was
(at least in my opinion), made thoroughly unwarranted and mathematically
unsubstantiable assertions about Cambridge theories of growth cycles35, [33],
p.54:
"[T]he development of trade-cycle theories that followed Keynes￿
General Theory has proved to be positively inimical to the idea that
cycle and dynamic growth are inherently connected analytically ￿to
the idea that is that the cycle is a mere by-product of, and could
not occur in the absence of, ￿ progress￿ . For it has been repeatedly
(and in my view, conclusively36) shown that a few simple additions
to Keynes￿own model of a general equilibrium of production in the
economy will produce the result that this ￿ equilibrium￿will take the
form, not of a simple steady rate of production in time, but a rhyth-
mical movement of constant amplitude and period ￿in other words,
a perpetual oscillation around a stationary equilibrium position."
Almost all the analytical assertions in this Kaldorian observation are in-
correct. The damage this kind of technically groundless claims do, especially
when invoked uncritically by natural post Keynesians like King ([40]), to any
attempt by non-mathematical post Keynesians to develop a Postkeynesian the-
ory of growth cycles is immeasurable, and appeals only to mathematically able
rash ￿ impossibility￿assertion - without the careful Schumpeterian caveat: ￿ here￿!
33I shall, thus, from now on refer to Cambridge theories of aggregate growth cycles.
34I should state very explicitly that Kaldor was my ￿rst Cambridge PhD supervisor, and
this ￿ privilege￿ of being one of his last formal doctoral students was entirely due to Geo⁄
Harcourt￿ s felicitous ￿ at least as far as Geo⁄￿ s intentions were concerned ￿ intervention.
Personally, the (mercifully) brief period I was Kaldor￿ s formal pupil came to an end with the
welcome return to power of the Labour government in February, 1974 and I was able to sit at
the feet of Goodwin for the rest his life, in Cambridge and Siena.
35Claims and assertions unfortunately approvingly referred to by King in his very readable,
but doctrine historically multiply ￿awed, particularly from the point of view of Postkeynesian
theories of growth cycles, book ([40], pp. 63-4). Indeed, King is completely ￿ o⁄ base￿in his
thoroughly unscholarly remarks on Kaldor and his early allegiance to Austrian capital theory.
Kaldor came to acknowledge his errors against Frank Knight￿ s acute criticisms of Austrian
capital theory only over twenty years after te famous Econometrica debates of 1937, in fact
at the celebrated Corfu Conference on Capital Theory ([34], p. 294).
36At this point Kaldor adds a footnote and refers to the classics of Kalecki, Goodwin and
Hicks, and to his own pioneering 1940 article ([32]) on Cambridge theories of growth cycles.
15economists, often unsympathetic to Keynesian thought and enthusiastic about
the ad hoc shockeries approach to business cycle modelling.
3.2 Encapsulating the Postkeynesian Precepts in Nonlin-
ear, Endogenous, Nonstochastic Business Cycle The-
ories
"[The] purpose [of an Essay on the Importance of Being Nonlin-
ear ([95])] is to convince the reasonable skeptic that much of con-
stitutes our body of theoretical knowledge in natural philosophy is
based on linear mathematical concepts and to suggest how the more
encompassing ideas of nonlinear mathematics would be better suited
to the understanding of existing data sets."
Bruce West ([95], p.3; italics in the original.
There are at least two kinds of Cambridge theories of nonlinear, endogenous,
nonstochastic growth cycle theories, each satisfying one set of Postkeynesian
precepts, but neither encapsulating all of them (in complete agreement with the
caution by Hanouda and Harcourt, to which I referred in the opening lines of
the previous section).
3.2.1 The Canonical Nonlinear Di⁄erence-Di⁄erential Equation of
Cambridge Theories of Growth Cycles
The following nonlinear, endogenous, nonstochastic di⁄erential-di⁄erence equa-
tion subsumes every classic equation that characterises the models of the pio-
neers of nonlinear, endogenous, nonstochastic business cycle theories ￿all the
way from Kalecki, via Lundberg and Kaldor, to Goodwin and Hicks:
"y0 (t + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)y (t + ￿) = OA (t + ￿) + ￿[y0 (t)] (2)
Where:





: the ￿ exible accelerator; OA : the sum of autonomous outlays ( ￿ (t) and
l(t) );
The standard canonical equation (1), given earlier, is the basis for Yasui￿ s
famous formal ￿ equivalence￿result, [96] between the classic nonlinear, endoge-
nous, nonstochastic models of aggregate ￿ uctuations developed by the pioneers:
i.e., Kaldor, Goodwin and Hicks. That equation was obtained from (2) by an
approximation that is hard to justify on economic grounds, and assuming techni-
cal progress to be an exogenously given constant. It entailed an approximation
of the nonlinear di⁄erential-di⁄erence equation (2) by a nonlinear di⁄erential
equation of unforced van der Pol-rayleigh type, such a (1). This was obtained
simply by expanding the two leading terms of (2) in a Taylor series and retaining
only the relevant ￿rst two terms.
16The result was an appeal to standard results in planar dynamical systems
and the genesis of limit cycles, existence of which was occasionally proved by
an appeal to the celebrated PoincarØ-Bendixson theorem or the Levinson-Smith
theorem. This became an academic ￿ industry￿ , ￿rst pioneered by the Japanese
trio of Yasui, Ichimura and Morishima (cf. for an almost exhaustive story of
this episode in [89]).
But, unfortunately, this approximation of the economically derived (2), by
a mathematically convenient (1), implies that the Postkeynesian precepts on
historical time and non-ergodicity/complexity are not satis￿ed. Apparently,
also, functional income distribution and systemic uncertainty37 are di¢ cult to
demonstrate in such a system. However, these properties can be shown in a
more accurate approximation, retaining higher order terms of the Taylor series,







































































y00 (t)+[" + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]y0 (t)￿￿[y0 (t)]+(1 ￿ ￿)y (t) = 0
(5)
A simulation of these more ￿nessed approximations, with the same values for
the parameters as in [17], ￿ restores￿the two Postkeynesian precepts of historical
time and non-ergodicity/complexity, and, in fact, strengthens its possibility of
demonstrating the fallacy of composition. For example the much vaunted prop-
erty of (1) to generate a (unique) limit cycle, independent of initial conditions
￿i.e., independent of ￿ history￿￿is not relevant for the more ￿nessed approxi-
mation, where not only is apparent uniqueness is lost, but also the appearance
of unstable limit cycles can be shown, in addition, of course, to multiple limit
cycles, each dependent on initial conditions38.
37To show systemic uncertainty in this kind of dynamics, as mentioned earlier, it is necessary
to show that these more ￿nessed approximate systems are capable of computation universality.
For now, I am not able to o⁄er a convincing proof, although I am fairly certain that it is possible
with some concentrated work on the construction of the equivalence between the trajectory
of a coupled, forced, Rayleigh-van der Pol system and the computing trajectory of a Turing
Machine, initialised consistently with the dynamical system.
38As a matter of fact this kind of behaviour was shown by Chang and Smyth ([2]) for the
original Kaldor model, making nonsense of Kaldor￿ s unscholarly remarks on the pioneering
works of Kalecki, Goodwin, Hicks and Kaldor himself (as quoted and pointed out above).
173.2.2 The Canonical Nonlinear System of Di⁄erential Equations of
Cambridge Theories of Growth Cycles
Starting from Goodwin￿ s celebrated Dobb Festschrift classic, A Growth Cycle
([19]), it is possible to divest it of all its non-Keynesian elements ￿assumption
of Say￿ s Law, a ￿xed-coe¢ cient production function, and so on ￿and also its
unattractive mathematical features ￿primarily structural instability ￿whilst
preserving its crucial emphasis on functional income distribution as the ac-
commodating, adjusting, variable in the disequilibrium path, and generate the
following canonical three variable system of nonlinear di⁄erential equations,
parametrised by Tobin￿ s q, capable of satisfying many of the precepts for a
Cambridge theory of growth cycles:
_ u
u






= H (u;v;y;q) (8)
Where the notation is as in Goodwin￿ s classic, except for the removal of the





where: Yd : Demand for output (real); Y s : Supply of output (real);
Introducing di⁄erential savings propensities in classic Kaldorian fashion, we
can get:
y = 1 + u[sc (u) ￿ sw (u;v)] ￿ sc (u) (10)
The assumption on production is via the technical progress function, along






























Under very standard assumptions it can be shown that the dynamical sys-
tem in the unemployment ratio (v), functional income distribution (u) and
disequilibrium in the good market (y), i.e., equations (6) ￿ (8), parametrised
by Tobin￿ s q, exhibits a Hopf bifurcation from a limit point to a non-trivial peri-
odic orbit ([88]). Every Postkeynesian precept, except systemic uncertainty and
￿ time-to-build￿can be satis￿ed by this system, although historical time, non-
ergodicity/complexity and the fallacy of composition requires that the above
building blocks be considered for ￿ subsectors￿of the economy (as, for exam-
ple, in yet another of the Goodwin classics: Dynamical Coupling with Especial
Reference to Markets Having Production Lags, [15]).
184 Minsky￿ s Theory of Crisis
￿Keynes￿General Theory viewed the progress of the economy as a
cyclical process; his theory allowed for transitory states of moderate
unemployment and minor in￿ ations as well as serious in￿ ations and
deep depressions. ... In a footnote Keynes noted that ￿ it is in the
transition that we actually have our being￿ . This remark succinctly
catches the inherently dynamic characteristics of the economy being
studied.￿
Hyman Minsky, [63], p. 97.
I shall assume that Minsky￿ s study and modelling of ￿ the inherently dynamic
characteristics￿ of a credit-based capitalist economy is one that is always in
￿ transitory states of being￿ , never ￿ becoming￿ stable or unstable, but always
tending to the one or the other. Technically, from the point of view of dynamical
systems theory , this means that the tripartite Minsky-regimes (see below) are
always in one or another ￿ basin of attraction￿of a dynamical system, without
ever reaching (or ever ￿ being￿at) the system￿ s attractors.
The conceptual underpinnings of Minsky￿ s desiderata for modelling crises
in credit-based capitalist economies seem to have been culled out of selected
contributions by Irving Fisher, Maynard Keynes, Michael Kalecki ([36]) and
Dudley Dillard ([7]), although there are also some stray Schumpeterian elements
dotting the Minsky vistas.
Papadimitriou and Randall Wray ([69], p. xii; italics in the original), have
provided an admirably succinct encapsulation of the vast canvas that was con-
structed by Minsky to understand the unstable macroeconomic dynamics of
credit-based capitalist economies:
￿Minsky borrowed his ￿ investment theory of the cycle￿from John
Maynard Keynes. Minsky￿ s cycle theory derived from combining
two things: the famous exposition found in Keynes￿ s Chapter 12 of
the General Theory, which focuses on the inherent instability of in-
vestment decisions as they are made in conditions of fundamental
uncertainty, and the approach taken in Chapter 17 to valuation of
￿nancial and capital assets. .... While Minsky credited Keynes for
pointing the way toward analyzing the process of ￿nancing invest-
ment, he found it necessary to go much further. Thus Minsky￿ s con-
tribution was to add the ￿ ￿nancial theory of investment￿to Keynes￿
￿ investment theory of the cycle￿ . ... Since ￿nancing investment is
the most important source of the instability found in our economy,
it must also be the main topic of analysis if one wants to stabilize
the unstable economy.￿
In answering the question ￿ why does investment ￿ uctuate￿([64], pp.105-6),
Minsky postulates his famous ￿ three types of ￿nancial postures￿ : Hedge ￿nance,
Speculative ￿nance and ￿ Ponzi￿￿nance. The ￿ path-dependence￿￿i.e., history-
19dependence ￿of any current state of the economy, in transition, is characterised
by the evolving mix of these three types of ￿nancial postures.
The transition from one or another of these ideal types to another is when
￿ Keynesian uncertainty￿kicks into action, although it is not clear, in Minsky￿ s
voluminous writings ￿nor in any of those by Minsky scholars ￿how this is played
out by the interaction between individual and systemic reactions. In other
words, how an individual￿ s or an institution￿ s decision processes leave the domain
or pure risk analysis ￿and, hence, perhaps in the world of orthodoxy, expected
utility maximization (EUM) and the e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) ￿and
enter the domain of ￿ Keynesian uncertainty￿ . Neither the transition from one
pure regime to another, nor the evolution of the dynamics in the Speculative
or ￿ Ponzi￿regimes, underpinned by behaviour (of individuals and institutions)
based on ￿ Keynesian uncertainty￿has, to the best of my knowledge, ever been
formalized.
Now, the economic reason for the transition ￿ from an initial ￿nancial taut-
ness￿ , say in the Hedge ￿nance regime, is that ￿nancial ￿ ows signal a tightness in
the intertemporal ￿ ows of the income generating process. This signal of a taut-
ness ￿ is transformed into a ￿nancial crisis￿and the transition to the next regime
is initiated. At this point Minsky￿ s interpretation of the Kaleckian macroeco-
nomic pricing process plays its crucial role.
But long before Kalecki, Wicksell￿ s immediate Swedish followers ￿particu-
larly Lindahl ([51]) and Myrdal ([67]) ￿had devised a similar scheme, under the
forces of ￿ non-probabilistic uncertainty￿ , to generate unstable, disequilibrium
monetary economic trajectories. More importantly, it was this development
that inspired George Shackle￿ s pioneering work on non-probabilistic decision
theory in the face of incompleteness of knowledge, a situation far more coherent
and amenable to precise formalization with the tools of modern, non-orthodox,
mathematical analysis.
Finally, to the tripartite ￿nancial regimes and the Kalecki-type pricing rule,
was added the methodological precept of ￿ stability ... is destabilizing￿ , in every
transition regime. It is understood that every economy is always in a transition
regime, and every transition regime is a mix of the pure regimes, even when the
￿ Ponzi￿￿nancial regime rules.
Some critical caveats need to be mentioned, at least cursorily, at this point.
Firstly, there is the question of nonlinear dynamics in Minsky￿ s work and in
the attempts by many of his followers and admirers to model ￿ Minsky crises￿
nonlinearly. Secondly, there is the question of policy for ￿ stabilizing an unstable
economy￿ . Thirdly, there is the thorny issue of ￿ equilibrium￿ . Fourth, there is
the crucial question of the correct domain and range for the economic variables
in any version of Minsky-type models.
There is no evidence whatsoever, at least to this writer, that Minsky ever un-
derstood the mathematics of the nonlinear macrodynamic models that emerged
from what is generally acknowledged to be the pioneering works of Kaldor, Hicks
and Goodwin (see the previous section). At a most banal level, there is the re-
peated reference to the ￿ ceiling-￿ oor￿models of Hicks and Goodwin and the
absurd claim that the Hicksian trade cycle model is ￿ linear￿ . There are no ex-
20ogenous ￿ ceiling￿and ￿ ￿ oors￿in any of Goodwin￿ s many nonlinear macrodynamic
models. Hicks has two regimes, one with entirely endogenously determined, un-
stable equilibrium; and in the other, also an unstable equilibrium, only one of
the exogenous constraints is, in fact, active; the second one, usually the ￿ ceiling￿
is endogenous. All the way from [60] and [61] to [62], [9] and [6], there is a
series of misrepresentations of the structure, mathematics and economics of the
pioneering nonlinear macrodynamic models39.
Thus he ￿and his followers ￿were, unfortunately, unable to realize that
the identical endogenous mechanisms generating the unstable, disequilibrium,
nonlinear dynamics could have been harnessed to model, endogenously and non-
linearly, a complete Minsky model of a three-regime crisis, with the Kaleckian
pricing rule and transition regimes that encapsulate the idea of ￿ stability ... is
destabilizing￿ .
Where such models remain inadequate is where every formal attempt ￿again,
to the best of my knowledge ￿ to model Minsky Crises as formal (ad hoc,
nonlinear) dynamical systems: has failed to endogenise ￿ Keynesian uncertainty￿ .
Not even the admirably concise, nonlinear, attempt by Taylor and O￿ Connell
([84]) or its more pedagogical and clearer version in [83], Chapter 9, §7, pp.
298-305, escape the ad hockery of enlightened curve shifting.
Secondly, on policy for ￿ stabilizing an unstable economy￿ , there was the no-
ble ￿ Swedish tradition￿ , emanating from Wicksell, but most comprehensively
developed by Lindahl and Myrdal. Apart from a curiously unerudite, passing
footnote, in Ferri-Minsky (op.cit)40 , there is no evidence at all that Minsky
took the trouble to familiarise himself with the classic framework of an unstable
credit economy that Wicksell developed, and Lindahl and Myrdal completed in
the form of a dynamic, disequilibrium, macroeconomy with an unstable mone-
tary equilibrium that is in no way related to the real equilibrium of orthodox
theory.
Thirdly, there is the issue of equilibrium. Minsky￿ s economies are in their
transition con￿gurations, within the ￿ basin of attraction￿ of some attractor,
whether stable or not does not matter. Thus, when approached from the point
39There is the preposterous assertion, in [62], p. 258, that:
￿ Various ceiling models of cycles or cyclical growth have appeared. In all except
one, Kurihara￿ s model, the rate of growth of the ceiling is exogenous.￿
So far as I can see, this is just a blind paraphrasing of the incorrect claim ￿ incorrect as
to technical accuracy ￿in [47], p.8 and footnote 5 on the same page. Had they understood
the di⁄erence between an autonomous planar nonlinear di⁄erential equation and its forced
version, it would have been impossible for Kurihara, and, hence, Minsky to make such absurd
claims. It is a pity ￿at least for someone like me, who is fundamentally in sympathy with a
Minskyan vision of credit-based capitalist economic dynamics.
40￿ Sweden, which had a particularly sophisticated group of economists in the 1930s and
a knowledgeable political leadership in their Social Democratic Party, may have knowingly
introduced the welfare state.￿ , ibid, footnote 23, p. 89. Surely, one would have expected a
sustained advocate of active policy to ￿ stabilize an unstable (monetary) economy￿to be more
scholarly in studying the one actual example of theory and policy meshing admirably in the
precise sense of Minsky? There is ample literature, even by the Swedes themselves, of this
rich interaction (see, [68], [54], and the many references therein).
21of view of global, endogenous, capitalist dynamics, a Minsky model must nat-
urally encapsulate multiple equilibria. Are the destabilizing ￿nancial forces
generated during the transition to a stable equilibrium ￿i.e., the genesis of a
pure Speculative regime is an endogenously evolving dynamic process during
the time the economy is in the basin of attraction of the Hedge regime? This is
formally impossible within the framework of dynamical systems theory, without
a plethora of unattractive ad hockeries41. Why not simply give up on ￿ equi-
librium￿? My conjecture is that Minsky￿ s reading of Chapter 17 of the GT
was heavily indebted to Dillard￿ s interesting, but incomplete, interpretation.
Minsky, therefore, was not able to discern the Sra¢ an point in that important
chapter: that every con￿guration of the economy is some equilibrium, making
the notion vacuous ([38], especially p. 242)42 . If every con￿guration of the
economy is equilibrium , there are no transition paths; nor is there any sense in
the distinction between stable and unstable equilibria!
I now come to an issue that may have the air of an exotic ￿ objection￿ : the
relevance of real variables and real analysis in formalising the dynamics implicit,
say, in a balance-sheet constructed for an abstract Minsky-type economy, say as
in Table 9.3 in [83], p. 299. The numbers that enter such balance-sheets can, at
best, be rational values (both positive and negative). But the dynamical sys-
tem that is supposed to re￿ ect the evolution of the economy represented in the
balance-sheet ￿say, as depicted in Figure 9.8 (ibid, p.302) ￿ resides￿in the unre-
stricted two-dimensional Euclidean space. Any facile response that the answer
to this conundrum is to work with di⁄erence equations, or a discrete dynamical
system, misses the point. Of course, this is an objection to all ￿ unrestricted￿
dynamical system modelling in economics.
Finally, to what extent does a Minsky crisis model satisfy the Postkeynesian
precepts? I am in the unfortunate position of being completely ba› ed how to
answer this question!
41The most imaginative metaphor I can think of, for this situation, is the second of the
twelve labours of Hercules, the one against the Lernaen Hydra. It will not do to simply cut
o⁄ head after head, when Hydra sprouts two new heads for each one cut o⁄. Hercules had to
devise an innovative strategy, of the kind that Lindahl and Myrdal devised, disciplined by the
theory of economic policy, to maintain an inherently unstable monetary economy in place.
42Minsky￿ s indebtedness to Dillard￿ s reading of Chapter 17 of the GT is most clearly ex-
pressed in [65], especially pp.7-8. No reading of Chapter 17 of the GT can be complete
without placing it in the context of Sra⁄a￿ s masterly critique of Hayek, where the concept of
the ￿ own rate of interest￿was ￿rst developed ([81]). It is this notion that formed the fulcrum
around which the whole of the argument of Chapter 17 was formed. No wonder, then, that
distinguished Keynes scholars, from Dillard and Lerner (for example, [49]), to Patinkin and
Leijonhufvud, have not made much sense of this important chapter. None of these Keynes-
scholars have ever taken the time and trouble to understand Austrian capital theory and its
deep critique by Sra⁄a (op.cit), and, therefore, missed the essential monetary point in Chapter
17. I am eternally grateful to Stefano Zambelli for drilling this crucial point into my obdurate
mind.
225 Concluding Notes
Postkeynesian economics is nothing if it is not endogenously dynamic and policy
oriented. This was the natural domain in which the Cambridge theories of
growth cycles was developed. It is, ostensibly, also the domain of analysis of
Minsky, although here the nonlinear dimension is too slippery to locate.
If we are to take the Minsky vision of the dynamics of credit-based capitalist
economic dynamics seriously, and try to solve its policy dilemmas, then it seems
to me that the best analogy ￿as pointed out above, in footnote 20 ￿is the policy
maker as poor Hercules and the Hedge-Speculative-Ponzi being as Hydra . In
other words, every time Hercules slays one of the heads of the Hydra, two more
sprout from where the source of the slain one! Is this to be a Sisyphean task for
the poor policy maker ￿or can she emulate Hercules and ￿nd the equivalent of
Iolaus to conquer, once and for all, the seemingly eternal repetition of ￿ manias
and panics￿in credit-based capitalist economic dynamics?
Formally at least ￿and actually, of course, in Greek mythology ￿there is a
solution to the problem of Hercules vs. Hydra, meaning by this there may well
be a policy resolution to the eternal dilemma of recurrent manias and panics
([42]).
If we are to go beyond conventional nonlinear dynamics and broach new
analytic frontiers to formalize the Postkeynesian insights of the pioneers, my
conjecture is that we must respect the natural domain of economic data: i.e., the
natural or rational numbers, both positive and negative. This implies analytical,
epistemological and methodological conventions and constraints that will entail
less closed, less determined, mathematical models, encapsulating the richness
of undecidable propositions in incomplete formal systems, facing uncomputable
functions in the natural domain of economic data, economic institutions and
history.
In other words, economic formalism, to be faithful to the rich Postkeyne-
sian tradition, based on historical time and natural data and institutions, must
embark on a Diophantine revolution in economics43.
43As I have argued in a series of contributions, a synthesis of which can be found in [93].
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